

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 BRASIL 09635 01 OF 02 061129Z

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
----- 024651

R 061000Z NOV 75
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2353
INFO AMCONSUL RECIFE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 BRASILIA 9635

EXDIS

FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROGERS

E. O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, BR
SUBJECT: BRAZILIAN NAVY POLICY ON RELATIONS WITH AMCONSUL RECIFE

1. AMCONSUL RECIFE REPORTED OCTOBER 31 THAT COMMANDER VALDIMAR BARROS, CHIEF OF STAFF OF THIRD NAVAL DISTRICT IN RECIFE, HAD INFORMED VICE CONSUL THAT DECISIONS MADE AND ACTIONS TAKEN BY AMCONSUL BROWN DURING MORRIS CASE IN 1974 HAD MADE RELATIONS BETWEEN CONSULATE AND BRAZILIAN NAVY VERY DIFFICULT. WITH REFERENCE TO THE CURRENT PLANNING IN RECIFE FOR NOVEMBER 13-16 VISIT OF US NAVY UNITS IN BILATERAL US-BRAZILIAN EXERCISE AS PART OF UNITAS, COMMANDER VALDIMAR SAID THAT UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES THE PRESENCE OF AMCONSUL AT ANY OFFICIAL EVENTS IN RECIFE WOULD MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR THE US AND BRAZILIAN NAVIES TO ACHIEVE THE GOALS OF THE EXERCISE. HE ADDED THAT THE PRESENCE OF THE CONSUL WOULD RESULT IN ATMOSPHERE OF "GREAT FORMALITY" WHICH WOULD BE PREJUDICIAL TO THE GOALS OF THE EXERCISE. HE CONCLUDED THAT, WHILE THE BRAZILIAN NAVY HAD PLAYED NO PART IN THE VENTS LEADING UP TO THIS STATE OF AFFAIRS (THE FRED MORRIS CASE), THEY HAD TO FOLLOW THE POLICY OF THEIR GOVERNMENT, ADDING THAT HIS REMARKS HAD BEEN OFFERED AS A MEANS OF AVOIDING FRICTION DURING UNITAS SO THAT GOOD US-BRAZILIAN RELATIONS WOULD NOT BE DAMAGED BY "UNAVOIDABLE CONFRONTATION."

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IN HIS COMMENTS, COMMANDER VALDIMAR REPEATEDLY

MADE LEGALISTIC DISTINCTION BETWEEN OFFICE OF AMERICAN CONSUL, TO WHICH BRAZILIANS CONTINUE TO ACCORD DUE RESPECT, AND PERSON OF AMCONSUL RECIFE WHICH HE SAW AS POINT OF CONTROVERSY.

2. WE INTERPRETED STATEMENTS BY COMMANDER VALDIMAR AS APPARENT CONFIRMATION OF EARLIER BRAZILIAN NAVY COMMENTS TO ASSISTANT NAVAL ATTACHE TO THE EFFECT THAT

BRAZILIAN NAVY PREFERRED TO EXCLUDE AMCONSUL RECIFE FROM DIRECT INVOLVEMENT IN CEREMONIAL AND SOCIAL ASPECTS OF VISIT. DECISION OF BRAZILIAN NAVY TO OSTRACIZE BROWN IN THIS FASHION APPARENTLY REPRESENTS NAVY'S BELATED ADHERENCE TO CONTINUING PRACTICE ADOPTED BY FOURTH ARMY RECIFE LAST YEAR IN REPRISAL FOR BROWN'S EFFECTIVE INTERVENTION IN BEHALF OF FRED MORRIS WHILE LATTER WAS DETAINED ON SECURITY CHARGES AND TORTURED BY MILITARY AUTHORITIES IN OCTOBER 1974. AS DEPARTMENT WILL RECALL, EMBASSY'S AIDE MEMOIRE IN APRIL 1975 (BRASILIA 3044) SPECIFICALLY TOOK ISSUE WITH DISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT GIVEN BROWN BY MILITARY AUTHORITIES IN RECIFE AND RECEIVED FROM ITAMARATY ORAL ASSURANCE THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO INTENTION TO "CAUSE ANNOYANCE" TO THE CONSUL, THE EMBASSY, OR USG (BRASILIA 3670). SINCE NAVAL ATTACHE RECENTLY RECEIVED OTHER INDICATIONS THROUGH NAVY MINISTRY SOURCES THAT ADMIRAL KUSEL COMMANDER OF THE THRID NAVAL DISTRICT, HAD EXPRESSED NO OBJECTIONS TO MAINTAINING PROPER WORKING RELATIONSHIPS WITH BROWN, WE SOUGHT CLARIFICATION FROM NAVY MINISTRY AS TO WHETHER COMMANDER VALDIMAR'S COMMENTS TO VICE CONSUL RECIFE IN FACT REPRESENTED NAVY POLICY. AT REQUEST OF ALUSNA, CAPTAIN VAZ, LIAISON OFFICER OF NAVY STAFF, TALKED PERSONALLY WITH ADMIRAL KUSEL'S AIDE AND SUBSEQUENTLY INFORMED ALUSNA NOVEMBER 3 THAT NAVY AGREES WITH ARMY'S POSITION CONCERNING BROWN.

3. OBVIOUSLY WE CANNOT ACCEDE TO THIS OFFENSIVE ATTITUDE BY BRAZILIAN MILITARY TOWARD THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES IN RECIFE WHOSE ACTIONS THROUGHOUT MORRIS CASE, HOWEVER UNCOMFORTABLE FROM THE BRAZILIAN

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MILITARY'S STANDPOINT, HAD MY FULL BACKING AND THAT OF THE DEPARTMENT AND BROUGHT GREAT CREDIT TO THE USG. TO ACCEDE IN ANY WAY WOULD CONSTITUTE SUCCUMBING TO THE GROSSEST KIND OF PRESSURE ON A MATTER ORIGINATING IN THE DEFENSE OF THE RIGHTS AND PHYSICAL INTEGRITY OF AN AMERICAN CITIZEN, THUS REPRESENTING A REPUDIATION OF THE DUS POSITION ON HUMAN RIGHTS. MOREOVER, SUCH A CAPITULATION ON A QUESTION OF PRINCIPLE WOULD

OCCUR AT A TIME WHEN ACTIONS OF BRAZILIAN MILITARY
IN CONNECTION WITH LAST WEEK'S DEATH IN MILITARY PRISON
IN SAO PAULO OF JOURNALIST WALDIMAR HERZOG HAVE CREATED
A SHARP NEW CONTROVERSY WITHIN BRAZIL AND ABROAD. OF
LIKE IMPORTANCE IS THE NECESSITY TO MAINTAIN THE
POSITION STATED IN OUR APRIL AIDE MEMOIRE THAT US
CONSULS IN BRAZIL MUST RECEIVE RESPECT AND COURTESY
DUE TO OFFICIAL REPRESENTATIVES OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN
STATES.

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
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R 061000Z NOV 75
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2354
INFO AMCONSUL RECIFE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 BRASILIA 9635

EXDIS

FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROGERS

4. YOU ARE IN A BETTER POSITION THAT I TO ASSESS THE
REACTION IN INTERESTED SECTORS OF US PUBLIC OPINION
(INCLUDING THE PLAY-OUT ON CONGRESSIONAL
ATTITUDES TOWARD MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO BRAZIL),
BUT I WOULD JUDGE FROM HERE THAT THE REACTION WOULD BE
SHARP AND HIGHLY CRITICAL OF THE DEPARTMENT, THE US
NAVY AND DEFENSE.

5. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES AND IN THE ABSENCE OF SOME
SATISFACTION TO US BY BRAZILIAN NAVY ON THE ROLE OF BROWN
IN THE PROPOSED EVENTS, WHICH NOW APPEARS TO BE RULED
OUT BY LATEST STATEMENT OF POLICY BY NAVY MINISTRY, I
CONSIDER THAT A US NAVY VISIT TO RECIFE WITH A FULL
CEREMONIAL AND SOCIAL PROGRAM IS OUT OF THE QUESTION.
I SEE TWO OPTIONS IN HANDLING THE VISIT IN SUCH WAY
AS TO MAKE CLEAR OUR REFUSAL TO ACDEPT THE BRAZILIAN

MILITARY ATTITUDE IN RECIFE:

A. THE COMPLETE CANCELLATION OF THE VISIT TO RECIFE. I UNDERSTAND THAT CANCELLATION OF THE STOP AT RECIFE WOULD ENTAIL, FOR FUEL REASONS, THE CANCELLATION OF CURTAILMENT OF THE FINAL PHASE OF THE BILATERAL EXERCISE INASMUCH AS THE THREE US UNITS INVOLVED WOULD HAVE TO SAIL DIRECTLY TO LA GUAIRA, THE NEXT MAJOR NON-BRAZILIAN FUELING POINT. THIS OPTION WOULD MOST CONVINCINGLY DEMONSTRATE TO ALL CONCERNED IN BRAZIL AND

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THE U.S. THE SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH WE REGARD THE BRAZILIAN NAVY'S ATTITUDE ON A MATTER LINKED TO HUMAN RIGHTS. IT WOULD NOT ELIMINATE THE RISK TO THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, BUT IT WOULD REDUCE IT. IT WOULD ALSO BE RESENTED BY THE BRAZILIAN NAVY AND THE BRAZILIAN MILITARY IN GENERAL AND WOULD AFFECT NAVY-TO-NAVY RELATIONS.

B. THE CONVERSION OF THE RECIFE VISIT TO A SIMPLE TECHNICAL REFUELLING STOP, WITH THE CEREMONIAL ASPECT LIMITED TO A CALL BY ADMIRAL ELLIS ON CONSUL BROWN AND, ACCOMPANIED BY BROWN, ON ADMIRAL KUSEL. THE REFUELLING WOULD PERMIT THE COMPLETION OF THE BILATERAL EXERCISE. IT WOULD BE AWKWARD INASMUCH AS ADMIRAL ELLIS AND HIS COMMAND WOULD BE IN PORT ABOARD THEIR SHIPS FOR TWENTY-FOUR TO THIRTY-SIX HOURS, THE TIME ESTIMATED TO BE NECESSARY FOR REFUELLING. THIS OPTION WOULD BE LESS CLEAR-CUT RESPONSE TO THE AFFRONT TO THE USG. IF THE BRAZILIAN NAVY WERE TO ACQUIESCE IN THIS PROCEDURE (AND WE CANNOT BE AT ALL SURE IT WOULD), IT, AND THE CONCOMITANT CONTINUATION OF THE EXERCISE, MIGHT TEMPER THE BRAZILIAN NAVY'S REACTION BUT IT MIGHT ALSO CREATE VULNERABILITIES IN OUR OWN DOMESTIC OPINION.

6. TO ME, THE OTHER CONCERNED EMBOFFS AND CONSUL BROWN THE FIRST OPTION IS DISTINCTLY BETTER. THE CHAIRMAN OF THE USDEL JBUSMC AND THE DATT NATURALLY PREFER OPTION B. I SUGGEST YOU DISCUSS THE SITUATION WITH THE APPROPRIATE WASHINGTON AUTHORITIES AND GIVE ME THE RESULT.

7. ON HEARING FROM WASHINGTON, I WOULD HAVE THE BRAZILIAN NAVY INFORMED OF THE DECISION AND THE REASONS FOR IT, THAT IS, THAT THE UNUSUAL AND UNACCEPTABLE CONDITIONS ESTABLISHED WITH RESPECT TO THE PARTICIPATION OF THE USG REPRESENTATIVE IN RECIFE HAVE OBLIGED US TO MAKE THE CHANGE. I WOULD ALSO INFORM THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OF THE DECISION AND THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT GAVE RISE TO IT. ADMIRAL ELLIS WOULD SIMULTANEOUSLY INFORM HIS COUNTERPARTS. IN ALL THESE NOTIFICATIONS, ALL USG PERSONNEL ABOVE WOULD ADHERE STRICTLY TO THE POSITION

DESCRIBED ABOVE AND WOULD STRESS THAT IT IS THAT OF
THE US GOVERNMENT.
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8. DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO DOD/ISA, CNO AND, THROUGH
CNO, ADMIRAL ELLIS.
CRIMMINS

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